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9.1  Introduction 
The taxation of  multinational corporations entails a number of  complica- 
tions beyond those that accompany ordinary business taxation. One of the most 
complex and important aspects of taxing multinational firms is the treatment 
of interest expenses. Multinational firms may borrow money in one country in 
order to deploy the funds elsewhere. Firms are entitled to claim tax deductions 
for their interest costs, but the countries in which they borrow may not permit 
all of the associated interest expenses to be deducted against local income for 
tax purpose?. The method used to calculate allowable interest tax deductions 
can, in turn, affect financing choices and operating decisions. 
American tax law permits only partial deductibility of the interest expenses 
of  multinational firms. U.S. law  specifies rules that determine the extent to 
which interest costs incurred by multinational firms in the United States can 
be  deducted for tax  purposes against U.S.  income. These rules are often 
changed, the last major change occurring in 1986. 
This paper describes the impact on firm behavior of the change in the U.S. 
interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax  Reform Act of  1986. The act 
significantly reduced the tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expenses of cer- 
tain American multinational corporations. Congress changed the law in  1986 
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because it was concerned that U.S .-based firms received tax deductions for 
interest expenses on borrowing undertaken in the United States to enhance 
their profits overseas. The act introduced a new formula for multinational firms 
to use in calculating the fraction of their interest expenses that can be deducted 
against taxable income in the United States. 
This tax  change increased the tax  liabilities of  certain American  multi- 
nationals, and made additional borrowing more expensive for these firms. One 
of the concerns raised during the deliberations over the act was that this addi- 
tional cost of borrowing might discourage some firms from investing in new 
plant and equipment, since a sizable fraction of new investment is financed by 
borrowing. The object of this paper is to examine the impact of the tax change 
on the operations of those multinational firms that were affected by the change 
in interest allocation rules. To do so, it is necessary to compare the behavior of 
the affected firms to the behavior of those firms that were unaffected by  the 
interest allocation provisions of the 1986 act. 
The results indicate that the change in interest allocation rules significantly 
influenced the operations of  American multinational firms. Firms that were 
unable to deduct all of their interest expenses against their U.S. tax liabilities 
issued 4.2 percent less debt between 1986 and 1991 (measured as a fraction of 
total firm assets), and invested 3.5 percent less in property, plant, and equip- 
ment, than did other firms. In addition, the affected firms showed a greater 
proclivity to lease rather than own capital assets, and to reduce the scope of 
their foreign operations. All of these behavioral responses are consistent with 
the incentives created by  the interest allocation provisions of the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986. 
Section 9.2 describes the U.S. tax treatment of the interest expenses of multi- 
national corporations, and analyzes the incentives created by the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986. Section 9.3 describes the data used to analyze the impact of the 
1986 tax change, and presents the results of regressions that estimate the im- 
pact of the tax change on various aspects of the operations of American multi- 
national firms. Section 9.4 is the conclusion. 
9.2  The Tax Treatment of Interest Expense 
This section identifies the incentives created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
in order to facilitate the analysis of the impact of the act on the behavior of 
U.S.  firms. 
Interest expenses are generally deductible against the taxable income of 
U.S. corporations. There are, however, two important circumstances in which 
the deductibility of interest is of  limited value to an interest-paying corpora- 
tion. The first arises when a corporation has negative profits before interest 
deductions. Since a firm with losses pays no taxes, interest deductions do not 
reduce its tax liability. Corporations are permitted, however, to carry net op- 83  The Tax Treatment of  Interest and U.S. Multinationals 
erating losses backward up to three years or forward up to fifteen years.’ The 
second circumstance is one in which a firm is subject to the corporate alterna- 
tive minimum tax (AMT); firms paying the AMT face idiosyncratic tax incen- 
tives.2 
9.2.1 
Special problems arise in allocating the interest deductions of multinational 
firms. The idea that underlies U.S. law is that, when a multinational firm incurs 
interest expense in the United States, a certain fraction of the expense should 
be allocated as a deduction against taxable domestic income, and the remain- 
der allocated against the firm’s foreign income. The respective fractions are 
determined on the basis of the income-generating capacity created by the loans 
on which interest is paid. The extreme difficulty that this concept encounters 
is that it is not always clear to what extent a particular loan generates domestic- 
source and foreign-source income. 
In order to understand the significance of the sourcing of interest deductions, 
it is necessary to consider the treatment of foreign-source income. The appen- 
dix to this volume describes the U.S. tax treatment of income earned by multi- 
national corporations. Due to some peculiarities of the changes in U.S. tax law 
after 1986, certain firms found that the cost of debt changed significantly be- 
tween 1986 and 1987. The goal of the empirical work described in section 9.3 
is to follow and compare the behavior of those firms facing higher costs of 
debt to those firms facing unchanged cost of debt. 
9.2.2  Interaction of Interest Expense and Foreign Income Rules 
American firms with foreign income are generally not permitted to deduct 
all of  their interest costs in the United States against their domestic taxable 
incomes. Instead, the law provides for various methods of  allocating interest 
expenses between domestic and foreign income. The intent of the law is to 
retain the full deductibility of interest expense against taxable U.S. income, 
but only for that part of interest expense generating income that is subject to 
U.S. taxation. 
From the standpoint of taxpaying firms, the U.S. tax law’s  distinction be- 
tween domestic and foreign interest deductions is potentially quite important. 
If interest expense is deemed to be domestic, then it is deductible against the 
taxpayer’s U.S. taxable income. If it is deemed to be foreign, then the interest 
expense reduces foreign taxable income  for the purposes of  US.  income taxa- 
Foreign and Domestic Allocation of Interest Deductions 
1. Tax-loss carryforwards do not accrue interest, a feature that limits their value even to firms 
that expect to have taxable profits in the future. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) analyze the value of 
tax-loss carryforwards in uncertain environments. 
2. For the remainder of the paper, we analyze taxpaying firms that are not subject to the AMT. 
Lyon and Silverstein (1995) report that 30.7 percent of  firms with assets over $500  million paid 
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tion only. Foreign governments do not use U.S. methods of calculating interest 
deductions and generally do not permit U.S. firms to reduce their taxable in- 
comes in foreign countries on the basis of  interest expenses incurred in the 
United States. Consequently, interest expenses allocated against foreign in- 
come are valuable to a U.S. firm only if it has deficit foreign tax credits. If it 
does have deficit credits, then some of the firm's foreign income is subject to 
U.S. tax, and any additional dollar of interest expense allocated against foreign 
income reduces the firm's U.S. taxable income by a d~llar.~  With deficit foreign 
tax credits, firms are indifferent between allocating interest expenses against 
foreign income and allocating them against domestic income." If, on the other 
hand, firms have excess foreign tax credits, then any interest expenses allocated 
against foreign income are useless from the standpoint of reducing tax liabili- 
ties, since foreign income generates no U.S. tax liability anyway. 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 significantly changed U.S. tax law governing 
the allocation of interest expenses. Prior to 1986, the interest expenses of U.S. 
taxpayers were determined separately for each company within a controlled 
group.5  In principle, each company was required to allocate interest deductions 
between domestic and foreign source in proportion to domestic and foreign 
assets.'j In practice, however, this rule permitted taxpayers to structure their 
finances in order to obtain a full tax deduction in the United States for interest 
expenses associated with borrowing done in the United States. 
Consider, for example, the situation of  an American corporation that bor- 
rows $100 in the United States, paying interest of $10 annually. The corpora- 
tion has $150 of  U.S. assets and $50 of  foreign assets, and earns profits of 
3. Curiously, the law is written so that the additional dollar of interest expense reduces taxable 
income without reducing the foreign tax credits available for foreign income taxes paid. 
4. This statement, along with much of the analysis described in the paper, abstracts from the 
ability of  firms to carry excess foreign tax credits backward two years and forward five years. 
Firms that carry excess credits forward or back may (depending on specific circumstances) face 
incentives that are intermediate between those of deficit credit and excess credit firms. 
5. Separate allocation of interest deductions for each company within a controlled group was 
firmly established by Treasury Regulation section 1.861-8, issued in 1977. Prior to 1977, U.S. law 
was somewhat vague about whether all of the companies within a controlled  group should be 
consolidated for purposes of interest allocation, though in an important case based on pre-1977 
law (IIT  v. United Stares), the courts held that interest should be allocated on a consolidated basis. 
6. Taxpayers were given the alternative of allocating interest deductions on the basis of gross 
domestic income and gross foreign income, though it is hard to understand why a tax-minimizing 
corporation would do so, since tax-planning opportunities are so attractive using the asset method 
on a single-company basis. The regulation provides that, if the income method is chosen, interest 
deductions allocated against foreign-source income cannot be less than 50 percent of the amount 
that would have been allocated  against foreign-source income by  the asset method. Taxpayers 
allocating their interest deductions on the basis of domestic and foreign assets were required to do 
so based on the book values of those assets, unless the taxpayer elected to allocate on the basis of 
fair market values, and could demonstrate fair market values to the satisfaction of the IRS. Once 
chosen, taxpayers were required to continue to use the fair market value method until granted 
permission by the IRS to discontinue its use. Book values of stock (such as parent corporation's 
stock in its foreign subsidiaries) were not adjusted to include undistributed earnings and profits 
reinvested by the subsidiary corporations. 85  The Tax Treatment of Interest and U.S.  Multinationals 
$15, gross of interest costs, in the United States, and profits of  $5 abroad. The 
corporation does no foreign borrowing. Under pre- 1986 law, this corporation 
would be entitled to deduct only $7.50 (75 percent of  $10) of  its interest 
charges against U.S. income, since only 75 percent of its assets produce U.S.- 
source income; the remaining $2.50 of interest deductions would be allocated 
against foreign-source income. The same firm, with the same real business 
activities, could, however, reorganize its affairs in a manner that would permit 
all of the $10 interest cost to be deductible against U.S. income. To do so, the 
parent firm need only borrow the $100 in the U.S. market and then contribute 
the money as paid-in capital to a wholly owned domestic subsidiary that owns 
the firm’s domestic and foreign operations. The domestic subsidiary pays all 
of its profits to its parent as dividends. The parent firm and the domestic subsid- 
iary file a consolidated tax return and annual report. The domestic subsidiary 
has $15  of  U.S.-source income and $5 of  foreign-source income; it has no 
interest expenses. The parent firm has $20 of income on the basis of dividends 
received from its subsidiary, and $10 of interest deductions. The parent firm  is 
entitled to deduct all of  its interest expense against U.S. income, since the 
firm’s assets (its wholly owned subsidiary) are all in the United States.’ 
The Tax  Reform Act of  1986 significantly changed the method by  which 
interest deductions are allocated, specifically by introducing a “one-taxpayer 
rule” in which the attributes of  all members of  a controlled group-whether 
owned directly by  a parent firm or owned by  the parent through one or more 
subsidiaries-determine  the allocation of interest deductions between domes- 
tic and foreign income.s The motivation for the tax change-was  the insight that 
financial fungibility implies that borrowing by  one part of  a controlled group 
directly or indirectly influences the economic activities of all of the group. The 
act provides that the interest expenses of a U.S. taxpayer should be allocated 
between  domestic-source and  foreign-source income based on the relative 
assets of  the domestic and foreign operations of  the controlled group. Of 
course, several complications attend the implementation of such a rule. 
Taxpayers are required to allocate interest deductions between domestic and 
foreign source on the basis of the book values of assets held domestically and 
abr~ad.~  In the cases of  subsidiaries that are 10 percent or more owned by 
members of  the affiliated group, the book values of  stock held in the sub- 
7. Prior to 1986, U.S.  law did not use sophisticated “look-through” rules to determine the extent 
to which a U.S. corporation represents a U.S.  asset. Instead, a US.-located subsidiary was consid- 
ered to be a U.S. asset as long as 20 percent or more of its gross income for the  prior three 
years had U.S. source. In  the example, 75 percent of  the domestic subsidiary’s gross income has 
U.S. source. 
8. The changes in the interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were 
phased in over three years. Various phase-in rules apply to the interest on debt issued between 
1983 and 1985. 
9. Taxpayers have the alternative of using the fair market values of  assets held domestically and 
abroad, but if taxpayers do so, they are not again able to use book values without permission of 
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sidiaries are adjusted to reflect accumulated earnings and profits of  the sub- 
sidiaries. Hence, in the case of  an American firm that initially finances its 
wholly owned French subsidiary with $100 of equity, and in which the subsid- 
iary subsequently earns and reinvests an additional $400, the parent’s  book 
value of the subsidiary is adjusted to $500 for purposes of interest expense al- 
location. 
The 1986 act provides for a curious treatment of foreign assets and foreign 
interest deductions by  members of a controlled group. For this purpose, the 
gross value of U.S. assets and the net value of  foreign assets are used. This 
leads to a somewhat asymmetric treatment of foreign and domestic borrowing 
for purposes of interest expense allocation. Consider, for example, the case of 
a U.S. firm that has $200 of U.S. assets, of which $150 is equity and $50 is debt 
borrowed from an unrelated party; the firm also has $200 of foreign assets, of 
which $150 is parent equity and $50 is debt borrowed by the subsidiary from 
an unrelated foreign party. The firm has U.S.-source gross income of $40, U.S. 
interest cost of  $5, foreign-source gross income of  $40, and foreign-source 
interest expense of $5. This firm is required to allocate almost half of its $5 
domestic interest deduction against foreign-source income,’O and the firm is 
not permitted to allocate any of its foreign interest expense against domestic- 
source income, even though the leverage situation of the foreign subsidiary is 
the same as the leverage situation of its American parent. 
One of the consequences of the asymmetric treatment of U.S. parent firms 
and their foreign subsidiaries is that the tax law can encourage firms to finance 
their subsidiaries with debt from the American parent instead of parent equity 
or  unrelated-party debt.  Parent equity  in  foreign  subsidiaries reduces  the 
amount of  domestic interest payments allocated against U.S.-source income. 
If, in the previous example, the subsidiary borrowed $50 from its parent com- 
pany instead of from an unrelated party, and the parent financed the loan to its 
subsidiary by borrowing an additional $50 from unrelated U.S. parties, then 
the subsidiary’s tax position would not change (it still gets a $5  deduction 
against taxable income in the foreign country for interest paid to its U.S. par- 
ent),” but the parent firm would receive a larger interest deduction against 
U.S.-source income. The U.S. Treasury issued regulations designed to prevent 
U.S. firms from reacting to the passage of the 1986 act by financing their for- 
eign subsidiaries with loans from U.S. parents financed by U.S. borrowing.’* 
10. The firm has domestic assets of $200 and foreign book assets of $150, so it allocates four- 
sevenths ($200/$350) of  its domestic interest expense against domestic-source income, and the 
remaining three-sevenths against foreign-source income. 
11. Subject to two qualifications. Certain countries (including the United States) impose “thin- 
capitalization” laws that limit the amount of related-party interest foreign firms can deduct from 
local taxable income. In addition, countries often impose withholding taxes on cross-border inter- 
est payments; U.S.  firms with deficit foreign tax credits receive foreign tax credits for paying these 
taxes. Withholding taxes on interest are usually reduced, often to zero, by bilateral tax treaties. 
12. Details of these regulations are described in Froot and Hines 1995. 87  The Tax Treatment of  Interest and U.S. Multinationals 
9.2.3 
The upshot of the rules just described is that firms with excess foreign tax 
credits and substantial foreign assets (as a fraction of  total assets) could no 
longer enjoy the benefits of full deductibility of interest expenses incurred in 
the United States after 1986. Firms with deficit foreign tax credits, or those 
with no foreign assets, retain full benefits of  interest expense deductibility. 
As a consequence, firms in the first category can be expected to reduce their 
borrowing relative to firms in the second, and can also be expected to reduce 
the volume of their debt-financed investment activity.13 
Incentives Created by the Tax Rules 
9.3  Data and Results 
This section describes the data used to analyze firm reactions to the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986. The section presents the details of the procedure used to 
construct our sample of firms and some statistics that describe aspects of the 
behavior of these firms after 1986. 
9.3.1  The Sample 
We  use information reported by  Compustat on the balance-sheet items of 
large publicly traded corporations. Compustat currently provides information 
on more than 7,500 companies. We  select only multinational firms incorpo- 
rated in the United States: firms are included if  their reported foreign assets 
equal 1 percent or more of reported total assets for each year during 1986-90. 
Four hundred twenty-two firms satisfy this criterion. 
Foreign tax rate information is central to our analysis, since the hypothesis 
that firms maximize after-tax profits implies that deficit foreign tax credit firms 
will react quite differently to the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 than will excess 
foreign tax credit firms. We  construct foreign tax rates as the ratio of foreign 
income taxes paid to foreign pretax income as reported by  Compustat. This 
variable is somewhat noisy, but is likely to capture the major differences be- 
tween the foreign tax rates facing different firms.14 In order to attenuate some 
13. Two other studies examine the impact of interest allocation rules on the behavior of impacted 
firms. Collins and Shackelford (1992) find that firms with large ratios of foreign to domestic assets 
are more likely than other firms to issue preferred stock (as a substitute for debt) in the period 
after 1986. Collins and Shackelford do not, however, distinguish excess foreign tax credit firms 
from deficit foreign tax credit firms. Altshuler and Mintz (1994) analyze the borrowing patterns 
of a sample of eight multinational firms, finding that firms that are unable to claim full tax deduc- 
tions for interest payments in the United States are more likely to borrow abroad than to borrow 
in the United States. 
14. The introduction of the new interest allocation rules in 1986, along with other tax changes, 
gave some firms incentives to adjust the location and tax-avoiding behavior of their foreign affili- 
ates. In the analysis that follows, we take foreign tax rates to be exogenous to U.S.  tax changes. 
Endogenizing foreign tax rates could change the interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated 
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of the difficulties that accompany annual measurements of the foreign tax rate 
variable, firms are classified into excess foreign tax credit status based on five 
years of data, 1986-90.  Firms for which the average foreign tax rate over that 
period exceeds the contemporaneous average U.S. statutory corporate tax rate 
are classified as excess foreign tax credit firms; all other firms are classified as 
deficit foreign tax credit  firm^.'^ From our initial sample of 422 firms, six addi- 
tional firms are excluded, five due to insufficient tax rate information, and one 
to major ownership changes over the 1986-91 period. 
Firms that merge or acquire new firms may face dramatic changes in their 
tax business environments that have the potential to confound the analysis of 
their tax-motivated behavior. In some of the statistical work that follows, we 
exclude firms that show changes in total assets of  100 percent or more in single 
years, doing so with the idea of excluding firms involved in major mergers or 
acquisitions. This restriction reduces the sample size to 388 firms. Froot and 
Hines 1995 provides additional description of the sample of its construction. 
We measure changes in debt as the difference between total debt (long-term 
and current) in 1991 and total debt in 1986. Changes in capital are measured 
as the difference between net property, plant, and equipment in 1991 and that 
in  1986. Foreign assets are measured  as total  foreign assets in  1986, and 
the ratio of  this variable to total assets in 1986 is used not only to control for 
firm characteristics (degree of multinationality) but as part of the cost of debt 
finance after 1986.16 
9.3.2  Behavior of the Sample 
Table 9.1 describes the behavior of  our sample of firms after 1986. Firms 
are klassified into two groups on the basis of fraction of foreign assets (above 
median and below median); within group, they are further classified by excess 
foreign tax credit and deficit foreign tax credit status. Roughly half of the firms 
in the sample (51.4 percent) are classified as having excess foreign tax credits. 
Firms that differ in the fraction of their assets held abroad are likely to differ 
in other important observable and unobservable ways. The after-tax cost of 
debt-financed investments rose most sharply after 1986 for firms with excess 
foreign tax credits and significant foreign assets. The behavior described in 
table 9.1 is consistent with predicted patterns. Firms with excess foreign tax 
credits exhibit slower mean growth (from 1986 to 1991) of outstanding debt 
15. This classification of the foreign tax credit status of the firms in the sample is necessarily 
somewhat imprecise. The same firm may have excess foreign tax credits in one year and deficit 
foreign tax credits in another; furthermore, excess foreign tax credits may be carried forward five 
years or back two years. A firm’s foreign tax  credit status can be endogenous to discretionary 
decisions such as dividend repatriation choices. Experimentation with other methods of distin- 
guishing excess foreign tax credit firms from deficit foreign tax credit firms had little impact on 
the results. 
16. The mean ratio of foreign to total assets in our sample for 1986 is 0.247; the median is 
0.219, and the standard deviation is 0.152. 89  The Tax Treatment of Interest and U.S. Multinationals 
Table 9.1  Debt and Property, Plant, and Equipment Accumulation, by Foreign 
Asset Concentration and Foreign Tax Credit Status, 19861991 
Foreign Assetsmotal Assets  Foreign Assetsmotal Assets 
below Median  above Median 
Excess FTC  Deficit FTC  Excess FTC  Deficit FTC 
Number of firms  97  96  92  101 
(Change in debt)/assets 
Mean  0.13678  0.13426  0.10556  0.15447 
Median  0.11705  0.05519  0.06016  0.14446 
Standard deviation  0.28151  0.22383  0.12348  0.24886 
Mean  0.13847  0.15538  0.13395  0.18940 
Median  0.11121  0.07145  0.13104  0.14902 
Standard deviation  0.24350  0.29645  0.22000  0.29366 
(Change in PPE)/assets 
Notes:  Firms are classified into cells based on foreign assets/total assets ratios in 1986, and by 
foreign tax credit (FTC) status as calculated over the 1986-91 period. (Change in debt)/assets is 
the difference between total debt in 1991 and total debt in 1986, divided by total assets in  1986. 
(Change in PPE)/assets is the difference between net property, plant, and equipment in 1991 and 
net property, plant, and equipment in 1986, divided by total assets in 1986. 
relative to 1986 assets, and slower mean growth of property, plant, and equip- 
ment, than do deficit credit firms. This pattern appears for multinational firms 
with small fractions of foreign assets (except for a negligible difference in debt 
changes for excess and deficit foreign tax credit firms with small amounts of 
foreign assets), but is considerably more dramatic for firms with high fractions 
of foreign assets. 
Figure 9.1 illustrates the mean growth of debt relative to 1986 asset levels 
for firms in each cell reported in table 9.1. The figure indicates that the impact 
of  excess foreign tax credits appears only in  firms with significant foreign 
assets, which is consistent with the discussion in section 9.2. Furthermore, 
there is a marked difference between the cumulative growth of debt in excess 
foreign tax credit firms and deficit foreign tax credit firms. A similar pattern 
appears in firms’ accumulation of property, plant, and equipment, as illustrated 
by figure 9.2. This figure indicates that the impact of excess foreign tax credits 
on the accumulation of  property, plant, and equipment is most dramatic for 
firms with significant foreign assets as a fraction of total assets. 
Froot and Hines 1995 provides a more detailed statistical analysis of  the 
behavior of the firms in this sample. The statistical results are quite consistent 
with the picture that emerges from table 9.1 and figures 9.1 and 9.2. Even after 
controlling for industry and degree of multinationality, firms that were unable 
to deduct 100 percent of their U.S. interest expenses accumulated 4.2 percent 
less debt (measured as a fraction of total firm assets) and 3.5 percent less prop- 
erty, plant, and equipment than did other firms over the period 1986-91. 
There are two possible interpretations of the tendency for firms with excess 90  Kenneth A. Froot and James R. Hines, Jr. 
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Fig. 9.1  Debt accumulation (as a fraction of 1986 assets), by tax status, 
1986-1991 
Nores: Bars measure the ratios of  five-year changes (1986-91)  in book values of debt to  1986 
book assets. Entries depict this ratio for the firm with the median ratio in each characteristic. Of 
the 193 firms with below-median ratios of foreign assets to total assets in 1986, 97 were classified 
as'having excess foreign tax credits and 96 as having deficit foreign tax credits. Of the 193 firms 
with above-median ratios of  foreign assets to total assets, 92 were classified as having excess 
foreign tax credits and 101 as having deficit foreign tax credits. 
foreign tax credits and high ratios of foreign to total assets to accumulate prop- 
erty, plant, and equipment more slowly than do other firms. The first is that the 
loss of debt tax shields experienced by  these firms results in a higher overall 
cost of capital and, consequently, a lower level of investment. Of course, to the 
extent that firms substitute away from debt finance toward cheaper after-tax 
financing  sources,  these  substitutions can  mitigate  the  increased cost  of 
capital.  l7 
The second interpretation is that firms do not face any increases in the cost 
17. In an extreme case, it is possible for these substitutions to reduce to zero the cost of  the 
change in the interest allocation rules. The size of the predicted cost corresponds to the ease with 
which firms can adjust their financial and operating patterns. Naturally, different models of firm 
behavior carry different predictions. Stiglitz (1973) argues that the tax advantage to debt makes 
borrowing a firm's preferred method of financing marginal investments. If this argument is correct, 
and firms continue to prefer debt to other financing methods even after some of its tax advantages 
are lost due to the interest allocation rules, then firms will react to the tax changes, not by substitut- 91  The Tax Treatment of Interest and U.S. Multinationals 
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Fig. 9.2  Property, plant, and equipment accumulation (as a fraction of 1986 
assets), by tax status, 1986-1991 
Notes:  Bars measure the ratios of five-year changes (1986-91)  in book values of property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE) to 1986 book assets. Entries depict this ratio for the firm with the median 
ratio in each characteristic. Of the 193 firms with below-median ratios of foreign assets to total 
assets in 1986, 97 were classified as having excess foreign tax  credits and 96 as having deficit 
foreign tax credits. Of the 193 firms with above-median ratios of foreign assets to total assets, 92 
were classified as having excess foreign tax credits and 101 as having deficit foreign tax credits. 
of  employing capital, but that they reduce property, plant, and equipment ex- 
penditures by leasing rather than owning capital. Lease prices reflect both the 
costs of  depreciation and the costs of  holding capital. The tax law, however, 
entitles lessees to deduct the full costs of their lease payments, without allocat- 
ing the capital component between foreign and domestic source. Hence, if  a 
ing other financing methods for debt, but by  reducing the size of foreign and total operations. 
Alternatively, the Miller (1977) model of financial equilibrium implies that firms impacted by the 
interest allocation rules will change their capital structures to pure equity finance. As long as the 
capitalization of the affected firms does not exceed the initial amount of equity on the market, this 
type of financial arbitrage implies that the interest allocation rules will not affect the capital costs, 
or real operations, of any firms. Gordon and Malkiel(l981) examine a model in which debt is tax- 
preferred, but its use raises the probability that a firm  will incur costs associated with bankruptcy; 
this model carries implications between those of the Stiglitz and Miller models. 92  Kenneth A. Froot and James R. Hines, Jr. 
multinational firm leases capital from a debt-financed, purely domestic entity, 
the interest cost of holding that capital will be fully deductible against US. 
taxes. Thus, leases may represent low-cost devices to preserve the tax shield 
for a given amount of property, plant, and equipment. This suggests that excess 
foreign tax credit firms-particularly  those with higher foreign asset ratios- 
had incentives to expand more rapidly the use of leases than did deficit foreign 
tax credit firms. And indeed, evidence reported in Froot and Hines 1995 indi- 
cates that firms that were unable to deduct 100 percent of their U.S. interest 
expenses were significantly more likely than were other firms to undertake 
new leases after 1986.18 
The leasing evidence raises the possibility that firms can easily substitute 
away from debt financing as debt becomes more expensive. If, for example, 
leasing can be  done at the same after-tax cost as buying, then the tax-law 
change may just encourage low-cost substitution. Of course, it is unlikely that 
wholesale substitution is costless, and many of the results are also consistent 
with the proposition that excess foreign tax credit firms face relatively greater 
costs of  capital after 1986. Firms may  choose to fund property, plant, and 
equipment off the balance sheet as a way of capturing part of the otherwise- 
lost tax shields. The portion that cannot be captured is a real cost. This may 
lead excess foreign tax credit firms to underinvest, to grow more slowly, and to 
restrict the scope of  foreign operations; this behavior, in turn, reduces their 
needs for debt financing. The tax-law change may also skew investments by 
affected firms away from businesses in which the tax deductions are crucial to 
be competitive. In this way, the loss of  U.S. multinational tax  shields could 
represent substantial firm-specific costs. 
One way to distinguish these possibilities is to examine changes in foreign 
and domestic operations after 1986. Firms that are unable to finance costlessly 
around the tax change face higher costs of holding foreign assets after 1986, 
since high ratios of foreign to domestic assets reduce interest tax deductions 
on outstanding debt. The results reported in Froot and Hines 1995 indicate that 
firms affected by the change in interest allocation rules scaled back their for- 
eign operations in response. The affected firms also reduced the size of their 
total (domestic plus foreign) operations. Since there is no reason to expect 
these reactions from firms with access to low-cost substitutes for debt, this 
evidence indicates that the 1986 act imposed significant costs on firms with 
excess foreign tax credits. 
18. Operating leases (to which we refer) are not included on the balance sheet, and the associ- 
ated lease payments are fully deductible against US. taxable income. Capital leases, on the other 
hand, are included on the balance sheet, and their associated lease payments are (as is true of debt) 
allocated for tax purposes between domestic and foreign sources by  section 861-8. We use mea- 
sures of  investment that include changes in capital leases but not in operating leases, and it is 
operating leases that are preferred by firms unable to take full advantage of  lease tax deductions. 
See, for example, Smith and Wakeman 1985; Edwards and Mayer 1991. 93  The Tax Treatment of Interest and U.S. Multinationals 
9.4  Conclusion 
The financing and investment patterns of American multinational firms re- 
veal evidence of  recent changes in the interest allocation rules. Specifically, 
the loss of full tax deductibility of parent-company interest expenses appears 
to have significantly reduced borrowing and investment by multinational firms 
with excess foreign tax credits. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms substitute away from debt when it becomes more expensive, as well 
as the hypothesis that the loss of interest tax deductibility increases a firm’s 
cost of capital. 
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